



In a Country not furnished with Mines there are but two ways
of growing Rich,either Conquest,or Commerce. By the first
the Romans made themselves Masters of the Riches of the
World; but I think that in our present circumstances,no Body
is vain enough to entertain a Thought of our reaping the
Profits of the World with our Swords... Commerce therefore
is the only way left to us,either for Riches or Subsistence.
(Locke,1691)
1. Introduction
The unequal distribution of the world’s natural resources
–whether mines of gold and silver in the 17th century,or
deposits of oil,gas,a nd uranium today– is a longstanding
problem. John Locke’s insistence on the primacy of contract
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raries was as valid then as it is now. In comparative terms,
nature has served Europe poorly when it comes to energy
resources. In the face of ever-rising demand,the exhaustion of
domestic resources and rising import dependency are the
logical consequence. The key question pursued in this chapter
is how Europe can best respond to such import dependency
and how it can progress in constructively engaging its trading
partners in order to safeguard European independence and
economic growth.1 In particular,the question is whether
Member States of the European Union should, one by one,
engage in bilateral negotiations with supplier countries.
In Europe energy questions have also played an important
role in the evolution towards an ever-closer union between
nation-states. The first common institutions of the six
founding members of the European Union were the European
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 and the European
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) in 1957. The founding
fathers of modern Europe had fully grasped the strategic char-
acter of energy supply security. To survive and function,the
yet-to-be-created European Union would have to be first and
foremost an energy union. Since the 1950s,E urope has clearly
made great strides towards closer integration,most impor-
tantly perhaps through the creation of a single market for
goods and services. Paradoxically,the integration of energy
policies has not made much progress since then,except for
the launch of a hugely problematic process of liberalizing elec-
tricity and gas markets,d efined by technical,legal,a nd finan-
cial rather than political questions. Even the international
coordination concerning coal,steel,a nd nuclear issues has
largely withered away. National choices in the energy mix are
today largely made without consultations among European
partners; common projects have a difficult time taking off;
and the EU Member States struggle to find a common voice
when talking to its key partners in international energy affairs.
1. Unless otherwise indicated, the terms “Europe” and “EU” refer to the EU-25, which includes
the following Member States: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland,France,Germany,Greece,Hungary,Ireland,Italy,Latvia,Lithuania,Luxembourg,Malta,
the Netherlands,Poland,Portugal,the SlovakRepublic, Slovenia, Spain,Sweden,and the United
Kingdom.
16 The External Energy Policy of the European Union1.1. AdifficultEuropeanenergysupplysituation...
The European energy situation is characterized by growing
demand, notably for gas and electricity,a nd slowly tightening
supplies in several facets of the supply spectrum. Efforts to
assure safe and affordable energy supplies in Europe are at a
crossroads. While there is no immediate crisis in the energy
sector,anumber of short-term and long-term pressures are
building up and are cause for concern.
Indigenous European oil and gas resources,which never
were abundant,a re dwindling and will be largely depleted by
the end of the decade. Coal,E urope’s most abundant resource,
presents problems of acceptability due to its environmental
impact. While alternative supplies are physically available,
there are only a limited number of suppliers,frequently in
geopolitically unstable regions (e.g.,the Middle East,N orth
Africa, Central Asia),which complicates the European energy
equation. The rapid growth of India and China, with
2.3 billion people between them,a nd the concomitant increase
in energy demand are further causes for concern. Observers
were also startled by China’s dynamism in securing physical
energy supplies,in particular from African countries.
In addition,the world has just been through a three-year
rise in energy prices,d uring which the price of crude oil tripled
and the prices of gas,electricity and coal all doubled. While
higher prices due to increased resource scarcity do not neces-
sarily equate with a decline in the security of physical energy
supplies,the sudden and massive increase in energy prices has
worried policymakers and the public alike. Russia’s decision
briefly to suspend gas deliveries to Ukraine in winter 2005-
2006 and to suspend oil deliveries to Byelorussia in winter
2006-2007,b oth vital transit countries,has further highlighted
Europe’s dependence on energy imports. Last but not least,the
accession of Central and Eastern European countries to the EU
in 2004 has revealed conflicts of interest in energy policy along
historical fault-lines. While it is unlikely that any one European
country could continue in splendid isolation in the case of a
serious interruption of supply,amore coherent and explicit
framework for European cooperation in case of emergency is
needed to calm sometimes overblown concerns.
Building a Common European Energy Policy 171.2.. ..ismadeworsebytheinabilityofdecision-makers
todevelopacoherentenergypolicy
The inability of policymakers in the European Commis-
sion and within national governments to decide between
competing objectives adds to the difficulties Europe is facing.
Reducing greenhouse gas emissions,limiting subsidies,
decreasing import dependence,phasing out nuclear power,
augmenting the use of renewable energies,liberalizing energy
markets,increasing economic competitiveness,etc. –the wish-
list of energy policy objectives is very long,indeed. Crucially,
European efforts to improve energy security are hampered by
the lack of an internal consensus about the trade-offs between
competing policy objectives.
1.3.TheTriangleofEuropeanEnergyDecision-Making
Consider,for instance,the share of gas in European energy
consumption (see fig. 1). Favored over coal for environmental
reasons and over nuclear due to cost,natural gas satisfies
objectives 2 (environment) and 3 (competitiveness). Unsurpri-
singly,its share in total primary energy supply is expected to
rise from 23% in 2004 to 30% in 2030 (IEA, 2006). Increased
natural gas consumption,however,means increased import
dependency and thus contradicts objective 1 (security of
supply). The inability to define lasting trade-offs between the
different objectives implies continuing policy drift.
Nowhere is the old adage that “crisis spells opportunity”
more applicable,however,than in the case of European energy
supply security. The EC’s Green Papers on energy security,
Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply
(EC, 2000; 2006),have sparked a wide-ranging debate. While
the debate is far from concluded, there are initial indications
of the main orientations that will guide European energy
policy-making in the coming years. Political commentators
and the public have begun to voice concern about the resulting
policy vacuum and are ready to contemplate stronger intra-
European coordination in energy matters and a more forceful
voice for the Union abroad.
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modern Europe. The European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC) and European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom)
were the precursors of the EU. However,to reminisce in this
way might do more harm than good. In the modern energy
world, there is no place for visions of manifest destiny. The
current situation does not require inward-looking,mutual
subsidization but the acceptance of global interdependence
and the creation of structures that allow global energy markets
to function. The energy security debate thus inserts itself into
the wider debate about the nature and the course of the EU. It
could even be a catalyst for an updated European policy iden-
tity. Rightly addressed, Europe and the EU have much to gain
from the current debate about energy security.
2.The Energy Security Situation in Europe
The EU-25 relies heavily on fossil fuels for its energy
consumption. In 2004,c oal constituted roughly 18% of total
primary energy supply (TPES),oil 37%,gas 24%,a nd nuclear
Building a Common European Energy Policy 19
Figure 1. The Triangle of European Energy Decision-Making
1. Security of Supply
(stability of International trading system,
short-term emergency storage)
2 . Environme n t a l Objectiv e s
( K yoto P rotocol, share of
renew able energies)
3 . E con o m ic C o m petitiv e n e ss
(liberaliz ation, L isbon S trategy)
Source: Jan H. Keppler.20 The External Energy Policy of the European Union
and renewable energies about 20%. From the perspective of
security of supply,E urope’s heavy reliance on oil and gas poses
the most immediate challenge,of course. Europe currently
imports about 80% of the oil and about 60% of the gas it
consumes. High growth rates in the use of renewable energies
of almost 5% per year (compared to growth rates for total
TPES of 0.5% in the reference scenario and of less than 0.2%
in the more proactive alternative scenario) will not funda-
mentally change that picture since their base is too low.
Given the historic inelasticity of energy demand in the
transport sector,a ny impulses for significant structural change
in Europe’s energy sector can only come from the power
generation sector. Coal and nuclear each represented 31% of
total electricity generation,gas 19%,hydro 10%,renewable
energies 5%,a nd oil 4%. Expectations are that the demand for
gas and renewable energies will grow rapidly (at 3% and 6%
per year,respectively,in a market growing at 1% per year) to
reach 32% and 19%,respectively,of total electricity genera-
tion in 2030 in the “policy as usual” reference scenario. This
coincides with the decline in shares of coal and nuclear.
Coal-fired power generation,particularly new coal plants,
will be progressively priced out of the market by higher prices
Source: IEA (2006).
Figure 2. EU Total Primary Energy Supply, 2004 and 2030
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P oli c y S eca r i ofor CO2 -emissions. Nuclear energy,on the other hand, is
hampered by political commitments –most notably in
Germany and in Sweden– to phase out nuclear power as well
as by the price risk that private investors in technologies with
high fixed costs (such as nuclear) incur in liberalized elec-
tricity markets. While gas-fired power generation,which is a
technology with low fixed costs,d oes not have such disadvan-
tages,it does,of course,pose specific questions concerning the
security of supply (see below). Gas is thus the variable of
adjustment when distinguishing the “reference scenario” from
the “alternative policy scenario.” Higher gas prices due to polit-
ical uncertainty and/or fiscal policy,c ombined with more
aggressive efforts to improve the efficiency of power consump-
tion and the competitiveness of renewable energies,might
lead to much lower growth of the electricity market (where
prices are set at the margin by the marginal fuel for peak-load
demand, that is,gas). In a smaller market such as this,gas
might stay at a share of 20%,overtaken even by renewable
energies with 24%,while a slower phase-out of nuclear power
would essentially make up the rest.
In summary,however,the modeling results of the
International Energy Agency (IEA),which to some extent
reflect a consensus estimate of energy experts,make for
sobering reading when applied to the issue of security of
energy supply. Even assuming the more optimistic “alternative
policy scenario,”Europe will consume more gas and an equiv-
alent amount of oil in 2030 than it does today. There are three
key reasons why the outlook for European energy does not
look very different from the present:
1. The intractable issue of oil demand for private transport,
where modest technical improvements are unable to compen-
sate for the rising use of ever-heavier personal vehicles.
2. The fast rise of gas,a round 1% per year,in both
scenarios due to the attractive economics of combined cycle
gas turbines (CCGT) in liberalized (and rapidly growing) elec-
tricity markets. This fact is linked to the decision of several
European countries to phase out nuclear power.
3. The inability of European policymakers to agree on an
effective energy policy that would need to be built around two
Building a Common European Energy Policy 21principles: (a) a commitment to liquid and transparent global
energy markets,a nd (b) strengthening the commitment to
energy efficiency and renewable energies with a pricing
strategy that fully incorporates impacts on the environment as
well as the economic effects of the risks of physical disrup-
tions and excessive volatility.
It would be unfair,however,to say that procrastination is
the only hallmark of the European energy situation. A picture
of essentially stable,or slightly increasing, total energy
consumption hides another picture,one in which economic
growth constantly plays catch-up with relative improvements
in the efficiency of energy consumption. Per unit of GDP,
Europe uses only 60% of the energy today that it used in 1970.
Its energy intensity is still 10% below that of the OECD
average,a lthough the distance between the high-intensity
countries of North America has shrunk both in absolute and
in relative terms.
2.1. TheOilSector
Directly or indirectly,recent concerns about the security
of energy supplies have also been prompted by the rapid rise
of oil prices during the last three years. Global oil prices rose
from a historic low of US$10 per barrel (152 liters) of oil in
1998 to US$20-30in the period 2000 to 2003,aprice level that
was close to OPEC’s announced target price of US$25-35 and
that experts widely considered to be sustainable. The three-
fold increase in the price to a historic high of US$78 in spring
2006 caught markets,including OPEC, by surprise. Oil is still
the world’s single most important commodity. Its price is to
some extent an indicator of the price of energy in general. The
rise in oil prices also drove a global boom in commodity prices
that is only now coming to a halt. Several factors contributed
to its massive increase:
–The inability of producers to increase supply: The oil
industry has investment cycles that can span one or two decades;
it was unable to respond quickly to any increase in price.
–The inelasticity of oil demand in the short run: High in
energy content,easily transportable and usable,oil is a vital
22 The External Energy Policy of the European Unioningredient of modern economies through the transport vector;
while changes in behavior are possible,they take years to be
implemented in response to price changes.
–Political uncertainties surrounding key supplier coun-
tries (including Iran,I raq,V enezuela, Nigeria, and to a lesser
extent Russia) added a risk premium of up to US$20 per
barrel; while the bulk of oil was still flowing freely,prices are
set at the margin,which means that in a tight market the risk
of a single country unable fully to service its commitments
pushes up prices.
–The fast growth of Asian demand for oil: Economic
growth of 5-10% per year was coupled with a massive one-
million-barrel-per-day increase in demand from China, which
was rebuilding its strategic petroleum reserves. 2 Of course,
Asian demand was also a key factor in sustaining the more
general boom in commodities.
–The technical and geological challenges for alternative
supplies (such as deep-sea or Arctic deposits or heavy oil sands
in Canada and Venezuela) to come on-stream quickly. In some
areas,such as Canada, environmental pressures and the
inability to find qualified personnel have limited expansion.
While the situation in the oil market is serious but not
dramatic, consuming countries cannot relax. In the long run,
oil prices will stay high to balance increasing global demand
with ever more difficult and more costly production condi-
tions. An indicative number for marginal production costs at
current demand levels might be US$35 per barrel (average
costs in countries such as Saudi Arabia can be much lower).
Add an uncertainty premium of US$10-20 due to political
tensions and US$50 all of a sudden look like a reasonable floor
for oil prices. Most important,however,is that even with a
well-working global oil market,oil supplies constitute not only
a price issue but also an issue concerning the continuity of
physical flows. The Drushba incident was a potent reminder
in this respect.
2.China’s strategic oil reserves, with a storage of roughly 20 days of demand, are still far
below the level of the stored reserves of most industrialized nations. Members of the
InternationalEnergyAgency(whichinclude the EU countries,exceptingBulgaria,Romania,and
the Baltic States), for instance, have a legal obligation to provide for 90 days of storage.
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prepared given that its oil supplies are far better diversified
than those of other major importing regions (see table 1). This
is different from the gas sector,which poses a more imme-
diate challenge to the security of European energy supplies,
the greater relative importance of oil supplies not with-
standing.
In addition,efforts are underway to diversify oil supplies
further. However,one of the most important oil infrastructure
projects of the recent decade,the 1,760km BTC oil pipeline
between Baku (Azerbaijan),T bilisi (Georgia),a nd Ceyhan
(Turkey),was undertaken without any official involvement of
the European Union or its Member States despite the fact that
European companies –BP (31% and project leader),E NI (5%),
and Total (5%)– hold major stakes in the project. The one-
million-barrel-per-day BTC oil pipeline that opened in
May2 006 is part of the strategy of diversifying the European
oil supply routes. One estimate says that up to one-quarter of
global incremental oil supplies of recent years will flow
through BTC (Starr and Cornell,2005: 39).
2.2.TheGasSector
The gas sector is currently the most vulnerable part of the
European energy sector. Contrary to oil or total energy,the
intensity of Europe’s economy has risen since the 1970s.
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Table1.I n t e r - A r e aOilM o v ementsin2005(t housa ndbarrels per d a y )
F rom
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F ormer S o v iet U nion 5 , 811 398 47 473 347 7 , 0 76
M i ddle East 3 , 144 1 , 360 4 , 2 69 2 , 345 8 , 7 0 31 9 , 8 2 1
A frica 2 , 681 773 1422 , 490 1 , 6 0 87 , 694
R est of w orld 1 , 6 2 58 53 767 8 , 2 17 3 , 853 15, 315
T ota li mports 13, 261 3 , 384 5 , 225 13, 525 14, 511 49, 9 0 6
S o u r c e : BP ( 2006).Europeans today use more gas per unit of GDP than 30 years
ago. While Europe shares growing gas intensity with the
industrialized countries of Asia (Japan and South Korea),its
absolute share per unit of GDP is almost three times as high.
Such rising intensity of consumption is highly unusual in the
energy sector and it can only be explained by the conjunction
of three factors: (1) the maturity of the gas transport system,
(2) the development of the combined-cycle gas turbine,a nd (3)
the liberalization of European electricity markets. However,
despite the good economic reasons for adopting gas-based
power production,growing gas intensity also means increased
vulnerability to physical disruptions of supplies and increased
economic vulnerability to changes in the price of gas.
Europe’s gas is increasingly imported. Total gas imports of
the EU’s 27 Member States from outside the EU area (i.e.,net
of intra-European trade-flows) amount to 317 billion cubic
meters (bcm),41% of which come from Russia. This is
certainly a large proportion and an indicator of a certain
degree of dependence. However,nowhere is the old adage that
dependence is mutual truer than in the current gas trade
between Russia and the EU. The 128 bcm that Russia exports
each year to Europe constitute the bulk of Russia’s total
exports of 151 bcm. In addition,it constitutes by far the most
profitable part of Russia’s enormous annual production of
598 bcm,which is fueled by domestic consumption that is
subsidized with prices at around one-quarter of world prices.
During the past ten years,gas prices have also more than
tripled. They roughly doubled in the past three years,b efore
easing in the second half of 2006. Quite rightly,politicians
and the general public were more concerned about rising elec-
tricity prices (of which rising gas prices are an essential part)
than about rising oil prices. Oil intensity has been steadily
declining,playing a far smaller role in government and
consumer budgets,the trade balance,a nd inflationary pres-
sures. The opposite happened in the gas market. It is
completely reasonable for politicians and consumers to focus
their policy efforts on this point.
Currently Europe is still producing 42% of its gas
consumption domestically. In addition,the least problematic
Building a Common European Energy Policy 25source of supplies –globally diversified LNG (liquefied natural
gas) trade– already constitutes 15% of imports and is rising
fast. It is estimated that European LNG imports will rise by
7.5% per year,c ompared to 5.1% for imports through
pipelines and 2.1% for the growth of total demand (Suez,
2006: 36). Global LNG trade will be fuelled by Qatar’s massive
“North Field,”which contains an estimated 900 trillion cubic
meters,c onstituting 14% of proven global reserves. The
increase in LNG trade is usually seen as a positive contribu-
tion to the diversification and the security of European energy
supplies. This is by and large correct. However,the establish-
ment of a truly global marketplace for gas can play both ways.
It allows diversification for both suppliers and consumers
–witness the discussion to export LNG to the United States
from Russia’s large Shtokman Field, on which the Russian
supplies to Europe will significantly depend.
European consumers will be in competition not only with
Asian and American consumers but also with Russia’s
domestic market. In the long run,however,the emerging LNG
market contributes to the necessary diversification of both
consumers and suppliers. The sometimes controversial discus-
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Source: BP (2006).sions about different pipeline projects,such as North Stream,
South Stream,or Nabucco,have to be seen in the same light.
A case in point is the Turkmen strategy to construct gas
pipelines to the West,the East,a nd the South. Every commer-
cially viable pipeline or LNG terminal should be built. In the
long run,the diversification and substitutability of both
supply sources and retail markets can only contribute to the
de-politicization of the gas market,with benefits both for
energy markets and for politics.
3.Key Developments Likely to Impact on EU Security
of Energy Supply
In the following we shall briefly sketch developments in
three key regions –Russia, OPEC and the Middle East,a nd the
United States– which are likely to affect the security of
European energy supplies in the medium term.
3.1. Russia:MeritsandLimitsofaSpecialRelationship
Russia is Europe’s main supplier of both oil and gas. The
EU-Russia relationship is thus of great importance to
European energy security. The decisive question,however,is
whether this relationship (significant though it is) should
insert itself into a global commercial logic, in which each side
is free to look for the best deal available,or whether it should
link the two partners in a binding long-term agreement. While
Russia is Europe’s neighbor and deserves every attention as
well as all technical and institutional help it is willing to
accept,the energy relationship between the two blocs should
be have a commercial rather than a political basis.
The reasons for this are not necessarily the obvious ones.
The dispute between Russia and Ukraine in winter 2005-2006,
unsettling as it was on a symbolic level,led only to a minor
shortfall of 100 million tons,which corresponds to a differ-
ence in demand due to a temperature change of 2 o C on a
single day (Ladoucette,2006: 4). Those who prefer to see the
interruption (together with the three-day shut-off of the
Druzhba pipeline in January2 007) as a sign of decreased
Building a Common European Energy Policy 27reliability should consider that the current dependence is
mutual. Gas exports to Europe constitute 70% of Gazprom’s
revenues (Finon and Locatelli,2006: 8).
The real reason for advocating a market-based approach to
energy relations with Russia is that the energy world is
changing. By the end of the decade,R ussia will be able to
export gas to East Asia, and Europe will be able to import gas
from Central Asia, Iran,a nd Iraq. New centers of supply and
demand have emerged that must be integrated into the world
economy. The fast-rising share of LNG transported by tankers,
in particular due to the discovery and exploitation of the vast
Qatari Pars Field, further transforms the gas market from a
logic of long-term bilateral relationships to a logic of multilat-
eral market relations.
The problem is that Russia’s production is not increasing
fast enough. Gas prices (including VAT) in Russia for both
residential and non-residential consumers vary between US$35
and US$70 per 1,000 cubic meters,d epending on the adminis-
trative zone. Compared to the current world price of about
US$235 per 1,000 cubic meters,this amounts to a subsidiza-
tion rate of between 70% and 85%. Run-away domestic gas
consumption is Russia’s (and with it Europe’s) biggest energy
problem today. Europe should assist Russia with policy and
technical advice to solve this problem.
Clearly,the perceived insecurity of property rights –what-
ever its legal,political,a nd historical legitimacy– did not
encourage long-term investment. This weighs particularly on
new exploration,which is now short of production replace-
ment levels. An additional issue is the new tax system intro-
duced in 2002,which taxes physical production rather than
profits. While this makes it possible to limit the extent of tax
evasion through skewed transfer pricing,it also limits compa-
nies’ incentives to invest in less profitable production in lower
margin fields,thus restricting supplies (Finon and Locatelli,
2006: 23-24).
What happens in Russia remains important. Much has
been made of the future supplier role of countries surrounding
the Caspian Sea as alternatives to Russia. One should not
28 The External Energy Policy of the European Unionforget that Russia still produces three-quarters of total oil
output and exports of the Community of Independent States
(CIS),with Kazakhstan making up most of the rest. Russia is
an important player in the world of gas and oil,b ut its power
to determine prices should not be overestimated. It is very
limited in the oil sector and far from absolute in the gas sector.
Its transition towards basing decisions on commercial rather
than political logic should be encouraged. In the long run,the
question of foreign direct investment is a more important
issue (for both Russia and Europe) than the issue of third-
party access to gas pipelines that has made headlines. To give
way on the latter and to ask for solid guarantees on the former
might be the EU’s best negotiating stance in order to improve
the security of its energy supplies.
3.2.OPEC:StilltheCenteroftheOilWorld
First of all,there is still plenty of oil in the ground. Second,
these resources are concentrated in a very small number of
countries. In fact,on the face of it OPEC looks stronger than
ever. For three years,oil prices have been above US$50 for a
barrel of oil. At the beginning of 2007,A ngola became the
12th member of the cartel,which now supplies 52% of the oil
imports to developed countries –the highest share in five
years. Experts widely agree that OPEC’s share will rise rather
than decline in coming years. In figure 4 below,one can see
that for 25 years,most new discoveries of oil reserves have
been in OPEC countries.
Looking closer,however,a nother picture emerges. Prices
are set at the margin,which means that the cost of the last,
additional ton produced determines price. If countries are
producing at full capacity (which OPEC has done in recent
years),they no longer have any influence over prices. The
increases in oil prices over the past three years happened
entirely independently of any OPEC action,which agreed on
production cuts only in the second half of 2006. The organi-
zation initially had even feared a world economic slowdown
due to higher oil prices and adjusted its original range of
US$25-35 per barrel only several months after the price
Building a Common European Energy Policy 29changes had occurred. The price increases were due to the
ending of a 25-year investment cycle that coincided with a
strong rise in Asian demand. This pushed global oil produc-
tion to its capacity limit. Due to the addition of a US$10-20
risk premium due to political and military instability,oil prices
reached US$78 per barrel without OPEC ministers having to
move as much as a finger. Much the same mechanisms have
been on display during the past twelve months with oil
reaching its historical high of US$ 135 per barrel in May2 008.
Despite recent oil price spikes (or rather because of them),
however,new supplies are coming on stream. Experts estimate
the amount of new production capacity currently being built
between three and four million barrels per day. That is a substan-
tial increase,easily capable of making a difference. OPEC is well
aware of this fact. Its decision to cut production by 500,000
barrels a day (about 2% of its total production),b eginning in
February2 007,is the logical response. This does not necessarily
mean that OPEC’s pricing power will be restored immediately.
OPEC countries have not been very dynamic in expanding oil
production,partly because of their wariness to attract foreign
direct investment and the technological and geological expertise
that comes with it. Other players,such as the countries of the
30 The External Energy Policy of the European Union
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Table2 . P r o v enO ilR e s e rve s in2005
B illion barrels of oil P erc ent of w orld tota l
EU C ountries of w hic h 6.00 .5
D enma rk 1.3 0 .1
I t a l y0 .7 0 .1
U nitedK ingd om 4.00 .3
E urope a n dE ura sia of w hic h 140 .5 11.7
Kaz a khsta n3 9.6 3.3
N orw a y 9.7 0 .8
R u ssia 74.4 6.2
M i ddle East of w hic h 742.7 61.9
I r a n1 37.5 11.5
I r a q1 15 9.6
K uwa it 1 0 1.5 8.5
Sau d i A r abi a 2 64.22 2 . 0
U nitedA r ab E mira tes 97.8 8.1
A frica of w hic h 114.3 9.5
A lgeria 1 2 . 2 1.0
L i b y a 39.1 3.3
N igeria 35.9 3.0
N orth A merica of w hic h 58.5 5
Can ada 16.5 1.4
M e x i c o1 3.7 1.1
U nitedS t a tes 2 9.3 2 .4
S outh A merica of w hic h 1 0 3.5 8.6
B r a z il 11.8 1.0
V enezuela 79.7 6.6
A siaP acific of w hic h 4 0 .2 3.4
C hina 16.0 1.3
T ota l W orld 1200.7 1 00
S o u r c e : BP ( 2006).Caspian Sea, East Africa, Mexico,a nd Canada, have stolen some
of the limelight recently. Nevertheless,geology is firmly in
OPEC’s favor. Its future role will depend, however,on its ability
to cooperate with the oil and gas companies of the developed
world in order to unlock the energy resources nature has so
abundantly provided its member countries.
3.3.TheUnitedStates:BigBoatsTurnSlowly
In recent years the federal government of the United States
has issued a series of high-profile announcements heralding
major changes in US energy policy. While announcing the
“hydrogen economy,”t he “alternative fuels initiative,”and tack-
ling the country’s “addiction to oil” have failed to make a lasting
impact on the ground, they are nevertheless testimony to the
fact that energy is high on the US government’s list of priorities.
For the time being,the US is the still the world’s largest
energy consumer (and carbon emitter),its biggest energy
producer,a nd, incidentally,the world’s third greatest oil
producer and its greatest importer. With 5% of the world’s
population,it produces 20% of global energy resources and
consumes one-quarter of them with a corresponding share of
greenhouse gas emissions (see table 3 below). Mechanically,
the US economy is thus much more energy-intensive than the
comparable economies of Europe,J apan,or China. While size,
population density,a nd climate can explain part of the differ-
ence,the main reason is price. Nominally,taxed end-use prices
for energy in the US –most notably for oil products such as
gasoline– are one-tenth of those in European countries.
While the US government has generously funded research
for new technologies,such as biofuels,c arbon sequestration,
and “clean coal” technologies,a nd while the 2005 Energy Act
contains substantial subsidies for a new generation of nuclear
power plants,the government has so far fiercely resisted any
attempts to use fiscal measures. Its refusal to sign the Kyoto
Protocol,or to commit itself to limiting greenhouse gas emis-
sions by pricing them through a carbon market equivalent to
the European Emission Trading Scheme (ETS),a re both part
of the same policy stance.
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Despite the discouraging slowness of the US government
in following up its grand announcements with decisive action,
it would be wrong to describe the US as at a standstill. The
initiative on new nuclear energy has already been mentioned.
It is seconded by the decision to create a deposit for the long-
term storage of spent nuclear fuels at Yucca Mountain,
Nevada. This puts the United States ahead of almost all other
industrial nations (exceptions being Finland and Sweden) in
finding a solution to the vexing issue of nuclear waste.
Regional initiatives (California and the Northeastern States),a
series of corporate leaders (most notably in the financial
industry),public opinion (influenced by Al Gore’s movie, An
Inconvenient Truth),a nd political initiatives (the narrowly
defeated McCain-Lieberman Act) all contribute to increasing
pressure for action on climate change. It is likely that the US
will see a federal limit on greenhouse gas emissions before the
end of George Bush’s second term. At the G8 Summit on June
6-8,2007,in Heiligendamm,the United States committed itself
for the first time to take climate change seriously.
Big boats turn slowly and in energy terms the United
States is a very big boat,indeed. Nevertheless,there are a
number of concurrent signals that a consensus is forming that
cheap,unlimited energy consumption is no longer as central
to today’s “American way of life” as it was in the past. If this
reading is correct and the different tendencies gather force,
Table3 . G lobal B loc s inC ompa r i s on
USA C hinaE u rope
P opu l a tion 2 9 0 1 , 2 8 0 470
S h a re of global5 % 2 1% 7%
TPES ( M toe) 2 , 3 00 1 , 180 1 , 0 8 0
M toe/capita 814
N o. of v ehic les (million) 220 13 229
O il c onsu mption ( Mbd) 22 51 3
O il import r a tio 5% 5 0 %7 7%
S o u r c e : CGEMP ( 2006).34 The External Energy Policy of the European Union
this would have an enormous impact on global energy markets
in the medium term.
4. A Multilateral Framework for European Energy Supplies
While others are moving,E urope seems to be standing
still –leaving aside for the moment its admittedly important
activism in the debate on climate change,to which we shall
return. What are Europe’s choices in this situation? Continue
with a proliferation of bilateral initiatives between different
Member States and individual supplier countries,b e they
Russia, Iran,or Algeria? Or develop a truly common external
energy policy consistent with Europe’s fundamental commit-
ment to open and transparent markets?
Posed in this way,the answer seems obvious. So far,
however,there has been precious little effort from the European
side to work towards the improvement of the multilateral
energy trading system and actively to promote free,liquid, and
transparent international energy markets. It seems that the
imagination of energy decision-makers is currently limited by
the ambition to repeat on a larger European scale the mistakes
that are committed again and again by its Member States. The
oft-repeated mantra that in energy matters “Europe needs to
speak with one voice” is only used in the sense that Europe
should better leverage its bargaining power by creating bilateral
rather than asymmetrical monopolies. The notion of a single
European buyer for gas smacks of the corporatist ideal to
impose the “just price” by sheer might of size and political will.
Such an approach would put European energy consumers
on the tenterhooks of the vagaries of intra-European horse-
trading and external political relations. Since it will be an
energy importing region for decades to come,E urope needs
open and transparent global energy markets. Its energy
companies are large and competent enough to hold their own
in the global marketplace. However,this marketplace has so
far evolved in a somewhat haphazard manner. Pricing arrange-
ments,c ontract modalities,the structure of production-sharing
agreements,the interaction of physical and financial markets,
etc. –global energy markets do not even have a commonlanguage,much less a common set of procedures,a nd even
less a common set of rules. The time seems rife (for technical,
political,a nd commercial reasons) to begin working on the
governance of global energy markets. It is in this direction
that Europe’s external energy policy must evolve. If Europe as
a whole insists on repeating in its external energy policy the
mistakes of its Member States,then the absence of a European
energy policy might be the lesser of two evils.
Of course,there is no harm in bilaterally acknowledging
mutual interdependence between supplier and consumer
countries and in agreeing on common projects. However,such
bilateral cooperation must not stand in the way of the work-
ings of global energy markers,in which each country and each
company may act as an independent profit-maximizer. Energy
will not be “just a commodity”f or many years to come. Yet the
more normal it is,the more beneficial it will be for all
involved. Europe should resist resource nationalism. However,
it should do so on economic, not moral,grounds. An effort
has to be made to explain that retreating into exclusive bilat-
eral agreements constitutes a sub-optimal solution for both
exporting and importing countries. Fortunately,resource
nationalism is much less virulent in practice than in rhetoric.
Most exporters quickly realize that gaining revenues by
exporting their resources is still the best strategy to promote
their national interests. In the long run,economic logic natu-
rally wins.
Europe should finally acknowledge the limits of bilater-
alism and “neighborhood policies” that now reach as far as the
western border of China. 3 The new Europe requires a more
3.Generalized bilateral initiatives (as opposed to cooperation on concrete projects) are of
limited help at best and can be a distraction and a drain on scarce resources. The number of
European “energy dialogs” is currently proliferating without tangible results. Other than the
dialogue with Russia, the European Commission entertains bilateral initiatives with almost
every energy-producing country in the world. An Energy Policy for Europe (EC, 2007), a syn-
thetic policy document for high-level decision-makers, mentions Memoranda of Understanding
withAzerbaijan,Kazakhstan,Turkmenistan,and Uzbekistan,aCommunicationtothe BlackSea
Council,contacts withOPEC,theGulfCooperationCouncil,LatinAmerica andtheCaribbean,and
aspecialAfrica-Europe energypartnership.The problem,of course,isnot that theseinitiatives
exist as part of normal international relations. Rather, the problem is that these routine diplo-
maticexercisesarecurrentlyatthe heartof the Europeanpolicytosafeguardenergysupplies,
an objective they simply cannot achieve.
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will not sway on its own countries such as Russia or the coun-
tries of Central Asia one way or another. At the same time,
Europe should continue to offer technological,financial,a nd
institutional aid freely. Frequently,exporting countries –espe-
cially smaller ones– are in dire need of it. The role of such
help is not to advance “influence” but to stabilize vital trading
partners.
Agreeing on a commitment to an open,market-driven
approach would lay the basis for a more secure energy world
in the future by rationalizing an energy debate too often
clouded by superficial pronouncements of “shared responsibil-
ities.” While there are shared responsibilities for securing
international energy markets,ensuring its position in interna-
tional market is a matter of each independent actor: Russian
gas exports to Asia are as legitimate as European gas imports
from the Middle East. The introduction of moral categories
into energy decision-making has only contributed to a deterio-
ration of relations. A multilateral trading system is by far the
most likely way to produce benefits for producers and
consumers. Partners in the process securing and strengthening
the international energy trading system must be the United
States,C hina, Russia, and Saudi Arabia.
Following a phase of excessive euphoria vis-à-vis special
relationships,E uropean policymakers are now fortunately
rediscovering the benefits of multilateral action. Five key
elements in this process are:
1. Continued involvement in multilateral organizations,
such as the International Energy Agency (IEA),the World
Bank,the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC),a nd the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The EC should also press for a global summit on the multilat-
eral energy trading system.
2. Europe’s leadership in the Kyoto process and the
creation of the European Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) for
CO2 emissions is one of the EU’s few policy successes in the
energy field in recent years,a nd can contribute massively to
decarbonizing the EU economy further.
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investment in supplier countries. The European Investment
Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD) need to work towards the legal and tech-
nical infrastructures to enable private investment. This is a
task,however,that can only be pursued in cooperation with
other major countries,most notably the United States,S audi
Arabia, Russia, and China.
4. Europe needs to stay involved in the process of the
Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). Its focus,however,should switch
from an emphasis on “third-party access” to clarifying the
conditions for investment.
5. EU participation in multilateral technical initiatives,
such as the World Bank’s Global Gas Flaring Reduction
Partnership,the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative,
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF),a s well as broader
adoption by EU companies and banking institutions of the
Equator Principles,is certainly useful.
Perhaps most important is the possibility that energy will
be included in the discussions under the auspices of the WTO
once the Doha Round –difficult as it is– is concluded. In any
case,a s far as external policies are concerned, any improve-
ment in the situation of European energy supplies will depend
on multilateral approaches.
5. Conclusion
The European energy supply situation gives reason for
concern but is currently not in crisis. Investment remains a
key issue. Policy uncertainty adds to a structural reluctance of
operators to commit to new investment,which raises ques-
tions about the adequacy of supply. In the electricity market,
much of recent investment has therefore been in combined-
cycle gas turbines (CCGT),whose low fixed costs are appreci-
ated by risk-averse investors. In response,E uropean gas
consumption has increased strongly,which has raised ques-
tions about the extent to which Russia can develop the neces-
sary capacity to service future increases in European gas
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and supplying its fast-growing domestic market.
Key to ensuring the security of energy supplies is that
Europe manages to formulate coherent policies in the interac-
tion between its objectives of market liberalization,environ-
mental quality,a nd security of energy supplies. In nearly all
permutations,this will require real energy prices to stay high
for the foreseeable future. It will also imply a more pragmatic
approach to electricity market liberalization,paying more
attention to incentives for investment,in particular by creating
less volatile market conditions.
As far as Europe’s external energy policy is concerned, the
choice is between a defensive and a progressive attitude. The
defensive attitude implies looking for opportunities for import
substitution wherever possible (at taxpayers’ expense if need
be),looking for bilateral “guarantees” for preferential treat-
ment (particularly in times of crisis),a nd pooling European
negotiating power wherever possible. The progressive attitude,
on the other hand, implies embracing the global energy
marketplace by trying to create the structures that give both
suppliers and consumers the confidence to go forward to
maximize joint benefits. The greatest risk on both the supply
and the demand side is uncertainty. Opacity,non-transparency,
and the mingling of commercial with political considerations
are thus the greatest obstacles to the security of European
energy supplies.
Europe’s energy supply security requires the stability of
the global multilateral energy trading system. Accepting and
organizing the international division of labor in this field is
the best way to realize the full benefits from nature’s riches
for producers and consumers alike. This implies keeping ques-
tions concerned with the organization of energy markets,a s
much as possible,separate from political considerations. A
number of encouraging initiatives in this direction have been
mentioned. However,they require a much more forceful
commitment to multilateral rather than to bilateral
approaches,a nd more creativity in searching for innovative
policy solutions in a rapidly changing energy world.
38 The External Energy Policy of the European UnionSuch a market-based approach to the world’s suppliers of
energy resources is also the best way –possibly the only way–
to further the convergence of the national energy policies of
the (currently) 27 Member States of the EU. Otherwise,histor-
ical relationships –good and bad– with specific supplier coun-
tries will always take precedence over common European
interests,a nd the primary objective of safeguarding European
energy supplies will be diluted by partial and short-term polit-
ical considerations. Of course,E urope needs neighborhood
policies. But it needs them as part of its efforts to build a
network of normal political,d iplomatic, social,a nd cultural
relations,a nd not to extract special deals in return for conces-
sions on other matters or to play one partner off against
another. The only criteria in the choice of a supplier should be
price and quality of supply. Burdening energy choices with
additional considerations is unlikely to improve the European
security of supply. But market-based energy choices do need
frameworks for negotiation. Creating such frameworks and
strengthening existing ones should be the primary orientation
of an external European energy policy.
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